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BENCH AND BAR
DISTRICT COURT DIGESTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE -CLAIMS
AGAINST GENERAL ADMINISTRATOR IN ANOTHER STATE DOES NOT BAR HIS
JOINDER IN ACTION IN NORTH DAKOTA. - Gifford v. Moe,
District Court of the First Judicial District, Cass County, North
Dakota, John C. Pollock, District Judge.
Churchill, a resident of Nebraska, was involved in an automobile
collision in this state which resulted in his own death as well as
the death of plaintiff's wife. A portion of his estate consisted of the
remains of his automobile. The County Court of Cass County appointed the defendant Moe as special administrator of Churchill's
estate with directions that Moe accept service of plaintiff's summons and complaint.
General administration of Churchill's estate was thereafter commenced in Nebraska and a general administrator appointed there.
Plaintiff moved to add the general administrator as a party defendant.
Defendant's counsel objected on the ground a claim had been
filed by plaintiff against Churchill's estate in Nebraska, and the
pendency of this claim was a bar to joinder of the general administrator as a party defendant.
Judge Pollock ruled that the joinder was permissible under N.D.
R.Civ.P. 20 and 21.
"From the pleadings in the action it appears that the interest of
the present and proposed defendants as special and general administrators respectively is identical. Each is a personal representative of decedent. One judgment will satisfy any claim against
both. Upon qualification of said general administrator in our
county court, defendant Moe would be subject to discharge by said
county court.
"Under the provisions of Chapter 204 NDSL 1955, in event of a
nonresident automobile driver's death in the accident which is the
subject of this action, the general. administratoi may be served in
the same manner and with the same effect as the decedent himself might have been had he survived. In one of the citations of
plaintiff in support of the motion the New. York Court holds that
such service made under a similar or identical statute is effective.
Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434; 18 A.L.R.2d 537.
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"Objection of defendant's counsel to joinder of the general administrator on the ground that a claim has been filed by plaintiff
against decedent's estate in Lancaster County Court, Nebraska, is
not a bar to making the general administrator a party to this
action. The amount of said claim is not liquidated. It is notice to
the general administrator and the probate court that plaintiff
claims a right to recover from the estate of the decedent. Only a
judgment such as may be given in an action on tort in this court
or one of similar jurisdiction can make it a liquidated claim. The
only manner in which such a claim may be satisfied in the probate
court where it is filed is by compromise between plaintiff and the
general administrator with the approval of the court. In event of
a failure to so compromise plaintiff would be compelled to resort
to the courts of that state. The action is commenced here and the
matter of liquidation of the claim can be determined in the instant
action."
CIVIL PROCEDURE-JOINDER OF PARTIES UNDER RULE
19(b) OF THE NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.- Lobdell v. Lenertz, District Court of the First Judicial District, Grand Forks County, North Dakota, 0. B. Burtness,
District Judge.
This was an action by three minor children to recover damages
for personal injuries on the ground of the defendant's alleged negligence in operating her car and colliding with them at a grocery
store parking lot at Grand Forks. The grocery store - Miller's
Super Fair '--was situated at the rear of the premises. The front
portion was used as a parking lot and was also used by patrons,
who had to cross the parking lot in going to and leaving the store
on foot.
Defendant moved to add Donald and Roy Miller, proprietors of
the store, as additional parties on the ground they were "solely or
jointly -liable for the damages complained of, that their inclusion
in this action is necessary for a complete determination of all of
the issues. involved and it is necessary to avoid a multiplication of
lawsuits and that it is further, necessary to best serve the ends of
justice." The motion was made under N.D.R.Civ.P. 19(b), which
provides::..
"When.persons who are. not:.indispensable, but who ought to be
parties if complete relif-is:.to be accorded between those already
parties, have not been made parties .and -are. subject to the juris-
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diction of the court as to service of process, the court shall order
them summoned to appear in the action. The court in its discretion may proceed in the action without making such persons parties, if its jurisdiction over them can be acquired only by their
consent or voluntary appearance; but the judgment rendered therein does not affect the rights or liabilities of absent persons."
Defendants contended that the Millers might have been joint or
concurrent tort feasors.•
Judge Burtness denied the motion.
1. "It seems admitted that the parking lot was level, that it had
no obstacles or pitfalls therein, that no employee of Millers had
anything to do directly with the accident and that about the only
contention which could be made tending to show any possible
negligence on the part of the Millers was the absence of some
attendant to guide traffic in and out of the parking lot which was
relatively small and somewhat congested." An examination of authorities cited to the court failed to reveal any case where liability
had been predicated upon failure to keep an attendant on a lot to
direct traffic.
2. The real issue was the construction of N.D.R.Civ.P. 19(b).
"In simple and unambiguous language it provides that the court
shall order those to be summoned and appear in the action 'who
ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between
those already parties.' " (Emphasis supplied by court.) "In this
case it is clear that complete relief can be accorded between the
plaintiff minors and the defendant.'
3. The Court's ruling did not affect the right of the defendant
to seek contribution from the Millers if defendant wished, and was
not an adjudication of the merits in any fashion.
CIVIL PROCEDURE-SERVICE OF GARNISHEE SUMMONS
UPON OFFICER OF STATE INSTITUTION. - Normand v.
Mikkelson (State of North Dakota, garnishee), District Court of
the Second Judicial District, Walsh County, North Dakota, A. L.
Lundberg,: District Judge.
Plaintiff i ued defendant, an employee of the Grafton State
School, and attempted to garnish-defendant's salary by serving a
garnishee summons upon the Superintendent of the Grafton State
School. On motion to dismiss the garnishment proceedings, Judge
Lundberg held that the service of the summons upon the Superintendent was insufficient and that such service should have been
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made upon the State Auditor under N.D. Rev. Code § 32-0905
(1943). The garnishment was therefore dismissed.
The plaintiff argued that the section of the Code involved provided that the State Auditor "may" be served but not that he "must"
be served, and hence was permissive rather than mandatory. It
was contended that plaintiff was entitled to proceed by an alternative method of making garnishment "and that since the Superintendent of the State School is the local head of the institution he
can be served just as the manager of a branch office of a corporation can be served."
Judge Lundberg stated: "In weighing these arguments we.have
looked at the histories of the legislation in question which often
throws light upon legislative intent and purpose. it appears that
Chap. 188 Laws of 1929, first amended See. 7567 C.L. 1913, so as
to permit garnishment of the State of -North Dakota or its institutions. It is to be noted that this Chapter contains the provisions
that service 'may' be made upon the State Auditor. It would,
therefore, appear that the Legislature recognized that it was broadening the remedy, and it would seem that, even though they used
language which appears permissive rather than mandatory, they
intended that service upon the State Auditor should be exclusive.
We have not been referred to any statute which indicates any legislative intent to include a State in the general category of corporations that can be served, by service upon someone in charge of
a 'branch office.' It appears to us that if the plaintiff had served
the Board of Administration a closer analogy to the business service method would have been reached as such Board is really the
'manager' of the State School."
Nor did N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d) (6) have a bearing on the situation.
This rule, in referring to an "agency of the State" refers to such
agencies as the Bank of North Dakota or the State Mill and Elevator Association, or any other agency that is recognized as a sort
of legal entity and so declared to be subject to independent suit by
the statute or statutes creating it. "While the garnishment statutes
are not expressly excepted from the rules of civil procedure and are
not listed in Table 'A' of the Rules, we think they would come
within the provisions of Rule 64, which appears to apply to garnishment, attachment, and so forth."
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE -SUFFICIENCY
OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AS GROUNDS FOR A NEW TRIAL.State v. lager, District Court of the Second Judicial District, Ramsey County, North Dakota, Albert Lundberg, District Judge.
Jager and Stewart were convicted of grand larceny in 1954. In
1957 the conviction was affirmed by the North Dakota Supreme
Court, State v. lager, 85 N.W.2d 240 (N.D. 1957), and on December 14, 1957, the Supreme Court denied a further petition to
amend the statement of the case. State v. lager, 87 N.W.2d 58
(N.D. 1957).
The certificate of remittitur was, however, not immediately transmitted to the District Court. On January 15, 1958, the defendants
moved for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence,
submitting to the District Court a six-page pencil statement and a
70-page statement both made by one Wheeler in the state of California. In these documents, the last of which was made to a lawyer
who interrogated Wheeler, Wheeler stated that he and a companion named "Sonny" committed the crime for which defendants had
been convicted.
The State resisted the motion for new trial on the grounds that
the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain it since the
Supreme Court had affirmed the conviction and the case was no
longer "pending." The State also contended that the alleged confessions were fraudulent, that Wheeler was in the employ of the
defendants, and that the statements had been made without notice
to the State or an opportunity to cross-examine Wheeler.
A hearing on the motion for new trial was held on January 20,
1958. Defense counsel advised the District Court steps would be
taken to "have Wheeler brought to North Dakota, or at least examined, after notice to the State, so that an opportunity for cross
examination would be presented."
On January 27, 1958, defense counsel advised the District Court
he bad been informed Wheeler was being "held by police in Ensenada, Mexico, but that the prosecution had announced they would
do nothing about attempting any extradition but would expect Mr.
Wheeler to appear voluntarily."
On January 30, 1958, the Supreme Court of North Dakota ordered the remittiturs .inthe action transmitted to the 'District Court,
the order being entered without opinion.
It appeared to the District Court there was "noimmediate prospect of Wheeler either being brought to North Dakota or being
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examined." Defense counsel advised the District Court "that the
procuring of a more adequate set of proofs seemed impossible in
view of Mr. Wheeler's being held in a Mexican jail and the State
taking the position that it was up to the defendants and not the
State to do anything about it."
On this set of facts, Judge Lundberg ruled as follows:
1. The District Court had jurisdiction to entertain the motion
for new trial. The matter of new trial is controlled by statute.
"There is not at the present time and has not been since Chap. 207,
1951 Laws, took effect, any time limit by statute within which applications f6r a new trial may be made except insofar as Sec. 292404 makes a provision and seems to set up a thirty-day limit after
discovery of the facts cited as a ground." The Court rejected the
contention that it was prohibited by State v. Prince, 66 N.W.2d 796
(N.D.), from entertaining a motion for new trial unless the case
was "pending" on appeal. "It seems to us that the 1951 repeal of
Section 29-2406 could only have one purpose, viz: to remove all
time limits within which a motion for a new trial can be made except insofar as. these time limits are restricted in Section 29-2404."
2. On the merits, the motion' for a new trial could not be granted. "One of the most fundamental rules of the law seems to be
that a new trial should not be granted .on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence unless such evidence is such as to probably
change the result of the trial." The Court also held that it is -the
duty of the trial court to determine the credibility of the newly
discovered evidence and if the Court "is satisfied that such testimony would not be worthy of belief by a jury, the motion should
be denied." However, in considering these matters the court may
in its discretion relax the technical rules of evidence, especially
where the newly discovered evidence is positive as to the innocence
of the accused and where the conviction rests on circumstantial
evidence.
However, the new evidence must be admissible under the established rules of evidence. "If we now proceed to examine the sixpage 'confession'. and the 'statement' of some 70 pages, which were
submitted to the court with the Motion, we are at once struck with
the fact that this material is obviously not admissible as evidence
in its present form under any rules of evidence."- (Emphasis supplied by court). "If a new trial should, therefore, be granted and
no more than this-.,nateriaI.
available it could clearly not change
the res.ult.!eausoit could .nytlze.ntr.p4uced.7
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The District Court further found that the documents tendered
contained many elements of improbability, and that there was not
a reasonable prospect that the improbabilities could be or will be
removed. Accordingly the motion was denied.
JUDICIAL REMEDIES
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORT
FEASORS ACT IS SUBSTANTIVE IN NATURE.-Juhl v. Wilkes
(Lester Juhl, Third-Party Defendant), District Court of the Second
Judicial District, Cavalier County, North Dakota, Obert C. Tiegen,
District Judge.
On August 13, 1956, the plaintiff was riding as a guest in a motor
vehicle driven by Lester Juhl which collided with a- tractor operated by the defendant Wilkes. Some time after July 1, 1957, plaintiff brought an action for damages against the defendant as a result. Defendant Wilkes thereupon impleaded Lester Juhl, the host
driver, as a third-party defendant under N.D.R.Civ.P. 14(a), alleging a right to contribution from Juhl on the ground he was a joint
tortfeasor.
The third party defendant moved to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, on the ground that at the time of the collision there was no
right to contribution among joint tortfeasors in the state of North
Dakota.
The third-party plaintiff argued that the Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, N. D. Laws 1957, c. 223, was in effect at the time
the action was instituted and hence was applicable.
Judge Teigen granted the motion to dismiss the third-party complaint. As a basis for, his decision, he ruled:
1. N.D.R.Civ.P. 14(a) permits impleidr of a
third-party defendant against whom-a substantive right- of contribution as a joint
tortfeasor exists. However, before impleader under Rule 14(a) is
proper a substantive right to the relief demanded in the third-party
complaint must be shown-.to exist. Wilson Storage and Transfer
Co. v. Geurkink, 242 Minn '60, 64,N*W.2d 9; Gustafson v. Johnson,
235 Minn. 358, 51 N.W.2d,-108.
2. 'At the time the accident occurred, no statute conferred a
right of contribution'mrnfig joint tortfeasors in this state. N.D.
Rev. Code § 1-0103 (1943) provides that in the absence of constitutional or statutory enactments applicable to civil rights and remedies the common law shall govern. At common law contribution
among joint tortfeasors was not permitted in the absence of statute.
-
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Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, Vol. 5A, § 1356 (Perm.
Ed.); 13 Am. Jur., Contribution § 37. Prior to the enactment of
the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, it had been held by the
Federal District Court that under the common law of the state of
North Dakota there could be no contribution among joint tortfeasors. State ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Bureau v. Przybylski, 98 F.Supp. 21 (N.D. 1951). South Dakota, possessing identical statutes, has ruled to the same effect. Wallace v. Brende, 66
S.D. 582, 287 N.W. 328 (1939); Tufte v. Sioux Transit Co., 7
N.W.2d 619 (S.D. 1943)- On these authorities, the Court was of
opinion that the right of contribution did not exist in North Dakota
prior to the enactment of the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
3. "The third-party plaintiff in his brief argued that the thirdparty defendant could not complain had the plaintiff brought him
in as a joint defendant. That the tort-feasor's contribution act only
provides a means of impleading a third party defendant under our
new rules governing third-party practice, but it does not give rise
to another cause of action but merely a right to implead another
where there is failure on the part of the plaintiff to do so. That
there is no new cause of action. No new liabilities are created, and
that it is of essence in this case that the action was brought by the
plaintiff after July 1, 1957, and after the joint tort feasor contribution act and the new rules of civil procedure came into effect."
The third-party plaintiff thus argued that the act was procedural.
The third-party defendant contended the act was substantive.
The court ruled that in the absence of language in the act providing that it was retroactive or retrospective in eftect, the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act could not be applied to actions arising before its effective date. The Court was of opinion that the
act is substantive in nature. "The statute first creates the right to
contribution, which is substantive, and then provides the procedure." The court cited Distefano v. Lamborn, 81 Atl.2d 675
(Del. 1951) as being of comparable nature. It also cited in support
of its view Klaas v. Continental Southern Lines, 82 So. 2d 705
(1955); Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 196 S.W.2d
919 (Ark. 1936); Bargeon v. Seashorne Transportation Co., 147
S.E. 299 (N.C. 1929); Norfolk Southern Ry. v. Beskin, 125 S.E.
678 (Va. 1924)6
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RES JUDICATA -EFFECT
OF DENIAL OF INSTRUCTION
ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE IN FORMER SUIT
BETWEEN PARTIES. - Pederson v. Bogart, District Court of the
First Judicial District, Grand Forks County, North Dakota, 0. B.
Burtness, District Judge.
On August 13, 1955, an automobile driven by Margaret Pederson
collided with an automobile driven by Alfred D. Bogart. On February 21, 1956, Bogart commenced an action for bodily injuries and
property damage against Mrs. Pederson, alleging negligence. Mrs.
Pederson filed an answer denying that she had been negligent and
asserting that Bogart had been guilty of contributory negligence,
but this answer contained no counterclaim.
On May 11, 1956, Mrs. Pederson commenced an independent
action against Bogart for property damage and bodily injuries arising from the accident, the action being based on the theory that
Bogart had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.
In March, 1957, Bogart's action against Mrs. Pederson came to
trial. Mrs. Pederson asked for an instruction to the jury to the
effect that if Bogart had the last clear chance to avoid the accident
and failed to do so, she was not liable. This instruction was refused and the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Bogart for $130H)
damages. Mrs. Pederson paid this judgment.
Bogart then amended his answer to Mrs. Pederson's action of
May 11, 1956, to allege that all issues tendered by Mrs. Pederson's
complaint had been adjudicated and that the action was barred by
defense of res judicata. Bogart then moved for summary judgment. In response, counsel for Mrs. Pederson contended that since
the trial judge in the action by Bogart against Mrs. Pederson had
denied an instruction dealing with the issue of last clear chance,
the matter had never been passed upon or determined.
Judge Burtness ruled that the defense of res judicata was well
taken and granted the motion for summary judgment. In his opinion he examined the ruling of the trial court in denying the instruction on last clear chance in the earlier case. He quoted the
earlier ruling, which contained the following statement: "Under
the instructions of the court given to the jury in the ... action, the
jury weighed the evidence and determined that it was the negligence of the defendant, Mrs. Pederson, which was the proximate
cause of the accident."
Judge Burtness stated: "As I see it the issue involved was completely adjudicated in the former case and is therefore res judicata
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and binding upon this Court." He cited as authorities in point
Mabardy v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 26 F.Supp. 24 (D.Mass.
1939); 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 1.28
(1950).

DIGEST OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS
JumcDICLx

BRANCH -

Juios

FEES AND MILEAGE

February 4, 1958
Section 27-0905 of the 1957 Supplement to the North Dakota
Revised Code of 1943 provides for traveling expense of jurors for
each mile actually and necessarily traveled each way to the place of
trial. While generally jurors are paid mileage for one trip each
way, and are not compensated if they return home while they are
excused, if the entire panel of jurors is excused for a period of
days, the county may pay the extra mileage incurred.
PuLrIc

BunmiNGS. - AWARDING CONTRACT TO DOMESTIC
CORPORATION OWNED BY NON-REsIDENTS

January 27, 1958
Section 48-0206 of the 1957 Supplement to the North Dakota
Revised Code of 1943 provides that in awarding a public building
contract preference is to be given to"... the lowest qualified bidder who has been a resident of the state for at least one year..."
A domestic corporation is a resident of the state under whose
laws it was incorporated. No one may look beyond its charter and
consider other facts in determining its residence. Therefore, the
fact that a domestic corporation is owned by a foreign corporation
or by foreign stock holders and a majority of its directors are residents of a foreign state is not.to be considered when applying section 48-0206 of the Code.

OPINION OF THE ABA PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
COMMITTEE
OPINION 293
(Adopted: November 13,. 1957)
ADVERTISING - Publication in a local newspaper of New Year's
greetings by a lawyer, improper under Canon 27, although without
designation as a lawyer, although party holds public office and
although supported by local custom.
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Canon 27,
Opinions 4, 59, and 109
The chairman of the local ethics committee of *a state bar
association has asked our formal opinion as to whether it is contrary to the Canons'for practicing lawyers to publish in a local
newspaper the following advertisements:
1. Councilman and Mrs. John Jones extend sincere wishes to all
for a Happy New- Year.
2. Happy New Year to all, John Smith.
Both John Jones and John Smith hold public office.
We are advised that the publication of such greetings is not
uncommon in the locality.
In the opinion of the Committee the publication of these advertisements is in each case contrary to both the letter and spirit
of Canon 27, -the careful reading of which the Committee commends to the attention of all lawyers.
In Opinion 107 we disapproved the publication in the form
of a joint Christmas greeting of an advertisement signed by
twenty-two persons, including ten lawyers.
In Opinion 59 we condemned the distribution by a law firm
in the form of a Christmas greeting of a "year book" convenient
as a diary or appointment book. In this opinion the Committee
said:
The purchase and distribution of the "year book" described
in the question is obviously a form of advertising. Its purpose
is to remind the client at the Christmas season of the fact that
the donor is still practicing law and the clear expectation of
the attorney is that, through the use of the book, the client
will be so reminded day by day during the ensuing year. It
is a subtle commercialism of the spirit of good-will which prevails at the holiday season, and its impropriety is not lessened
because it bears the guise of that spirit. The distribution of
such book, being a form of advertising, must be condemned
as a violation of Canon 27.
In one of its earliest opinions the Committee held that a violation
of Canon 27 was not justified by local custom: Opinion 4.
In the Committee's opinion the advertisements are not justified
by the omission to state that the advertisers hold public office
or that they are lawyers.
Lawyers continuing to practice as such cannot insulate themselves from the Canons by acting in other capacities.
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TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sirs:
I have read with interest your Recent Case commentary on Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673 in the January, 1958, issue of the
North Dakota Law Review.
I though it may be of interest for you to know that the Committee on the Draft of N.D.R.Civ.P. bad in mind Section 17 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act in preparing our own Rule 4(e) (3). We
limited service, however, to situations where the party to be served
shall "engage in business in this State". Service in nonresident
motor vehicle cases provided for by statute is preserved by Rule
4(f). The Committee felt it unwise to extend the rule to all tortious
acts or transactions, as was done in Illinois.
Actually, we adopted our Rules from Section 229(b) N.Y.C.P.A.
The Supreme Court decision justifying the constitutionality of this
type of service is found in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,
55 S.Ct. 553.
Very truly yours,
EUGENE A. Bulnicx,
District Judge.

